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ABSTRACT. It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least three
conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condition’, the ‘independence
condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’. The overarching rationale of these
conditions is that they ensure that authority is only justified when it provides the
best means for the subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually
has. However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presupposes a fourth
necessary condition. This condition might be called a ‘reliable belief condition’,
that is, that the putative subject must reliably believe that the putative authority-
agent satisfies the Service Conception (or more precisely, its other three condi-
tions). In sum, the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question:
is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject believes
that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception? As a matter of inter-
pretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear to lead in entirely opposite direc-
tions: some parts clearly support the reliable belief condition, others do not.
Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question reveals a broader
inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does include the belief condition will
it support Raz’s claim that authority is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’,
that is, acting upon one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority).
Only if the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it support
Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz must choose between one
or other.
Joseph Raz’s Service Conception is, by all accounts, the most
prominent and influential theory of legitimate authority. It aims to
set out the conditions that, subject to some principled exceptions,1
are necessary and sufficient to justify the authority of one agent over
another.
It is crystal clear that the Service Conception includes at least
three conditions, what I shall call: the ‘normal justification condi-
1 See below, end of Section I.
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tion’, the ‘independence condition’ and the ‘dependence condition’.
The overarching rationale of these conditions is that they ensure that
authority is only justified when it provides the best means for the
subject to conform to the reasons for action that she actually has.
However, it is difficult to clarify whether Raz implicitly presup-
poses a fourth necessary condition. This condition might be called a
‘reliable belief condition’, that is, that the putative subject must
reliably believe that the putative authority-agent satisfies the Service
Conception (or more precisely, its other three conditions).2 In sum,
the purpose of this paper is to pose Joseph Raz one simple question:
is it a necessary condition of your Service Conception, that the subject
believes that the authority-agent satisfies the Service Conception?
As a matter of interpretation, different parts of Raz’s work appear
to lead in entirely opposite directions: some parts clearly support the
reliable belief condition, others do not.
Regardless of Raz’s ultimate answer, however, the question re-
veals a broader inconsistency. Only if the Service Conception does
include the belief condition will it support Raz’s claim that authority
is consistent with one’s rational ‘self-reliance’, that is, acting upon
one’s own judgement (including, as to who has authority). Only if
the Service Conception does not include the belief condition will it
support Raz’s perfectionist account of government. It seems Raz
must choose between one or other.
In the first two sections of this paper, I outline the Service
Conception’s less controversial elements, and frame our central
question. I then outline, with exegetical support, two very different
interpretations of Raz’s work with respect to answering this ques-
tion. I then investigate the prospect of reconciliation, but only to
dismiss it. I conclude by drawing out the implications of this
inconsistency for Raz’s work.
I. THE SERVICE CONCEPTION
Let us first articulate the conception of authority that is the object of
the Service Conception; followed by the account of legitimacy that is
the substance of the theory.
2 Presuming, that if one agrees that another satisfies the other three conditions, then one would
agree that one so agrees.
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Raz starts ‘with the common thought … that authority is the
right to rule’.3 ‘Commands’ are products of its exercise that recipi-
ents, qua ‘subjects’ have a ‘duty’ to obey.4 We should emphasise four
key elements.
First, such authority is practical rather than theoretical (or ‘epis-
temic’). It is concerned with an agent providing to a subject, through
commands, reasons to act; rather than reasons to believe.
Secondly, it is de jure rather than de facto. It is concerned with an
agent who has a right to rule in a manner that their command, by
itself, creates a reason to so act (qua duty). This reason to act,
therefore, is not dependent upon extrinsic factors such as the threat
of punishment, (although such factors may create additional reasons
to so act).
Third, ‘duties’ are a special type of reason for action, conformity
with which is ‘nonoptional’. According to Raz, this is because they
are, in fact, the systematic combination of two reasons. First, a
reason to act as directed; and secondly, an ‘exclusionary’ reason, not
to act on the basis of otherwise valid reasons to act to the contrary.5
In this way, the reason created by the command is not added and
weighed against other reasons, but simply overrides them. Raz calls
such reasons, ‘protected’.6
Finally, Raz does not expand on the conception of ‘right’ in play
with respect to authority beyond being the ‘abilit[y] to impose or
revoke duties or to change their conditions of application’.7 Defini-
tionally, therefore, Raz takes the concept of a duty to be most
primitive.
Raz’s conception of authority, therefore, is the de jure ability to
impose (change, revoke etc.) upon a subject protected reasons for
action. The aim of Raz’s Service Conception, as a theory of legitimacy
is, putting aside deviant cases,8 to establish the necessary and suffi-
3 Raz (1985, p. 3, 2006, p. 1012).
4 Raz (2006, p. 1012, 1990, p. 115, 1986, p. 23).
5 See, Raz (1975, repr., Raz 1999a, b, pp. 39–84; 189–191, 2010, pp. 282, 290–291. Note, Raz has
clarified that that ‘exclusionary reasons do not, of course, exclude relying on reasons for behaving in the
same way as the directive requires’: Raz (2006, p. 1022).
6 Or, ‘pre-emptive’: Raz (1986, p. 59). Further, in the specific case of an authority’s command, duties
are also directional, that is, they are ‘in some sense owed to the right-holder’ Raz (2010, p. 290).
7 Raz (1986, p. 165ff, 2010, p. 291).
8 Raz (1989, p. 1181).
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cient conditions for such an ability. It clearly includes the following
three conditions.
First, that an agent would conform better to the reasons that
apply to her regardless of the command of the authority-agent, if she
intends to be guided by the authority-agent’s command rather than if
she does not. This is dubbed, ‘the normal justification thesis’.
Secondly, that the reasons that apply to the agent regardless of the
authority-agent’s command are such that it is better to conform to
them rather than to decide for oneself, without authority. This is
dubbed the ‘independence condition.’ The independence condition’s
chief purpose is to recognise that one important reason we often
have for action is the promotion of our own ‘autonomy’. Persons
with ‘autonomy’ are ‘part creators of their own moral world.’ They
not merely decide how to act for themselves but have a capacity to
(partly) define, through these decisions, what is valuable for them-
selves by creating personal projects, commitments, causes and rela-
tionships.9 Sometimes, therefore, the value of autonomy creates a
reason to decide for oneself, even if one would otherwise better to
conform to reason by following the command of another.
Thirdly, authoritative commands must derive from the authority-
agent’s own attempt to assess and weigh the relevant reasons that
already apply to the subjects in their situation regardless of the
command. This is dubbed the ‘dependence thesis’. It crystallises why
the entire theory is a service conception of authority; the authority is
only legitimate if it serves the pre-existing reasons of the subject.10
Further to these three conditions, there are also two key
assumptions operating in the background of Raz’s conception.
First, the ‘reasons’ that Raz himself envisions the Service Con-
ception as serving, that is, the pre-existing reasons that we have for
action, are all ultimately derived from the good. All practical reasons
derive from the respect, promotion and protection of ‘value’. Duties,
for example, owed to a person in virtue of their personhood arise
because they follow from the reason to promote and protect their
9 It also presupposes that one’s decisions are informed and effective, not subject to the coercion of
another, and made between genuinely diverse and valuable options. See, Raz (1986, pp. 154–155; 1995,
p. 119, 2006, pp. 1013–1014). See also, Raz (1986, pp. 87, 108).
10 Raz (1986, p. 47): ‘The argument for the pre-emption thesis proceeds from another, which I shall
call the dependence thesis. It says: all authoritative directives should be based on reasons which already
independently apply to the subjects of the directives and are relevant to their action in the circumstances covered
by the directive.’
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valuable ‘interests’.11 We have an obligation to fulfil promises because
they promote the value of promising, which derives, in turn, from
‘the value of enhancing control over one’s life.’12 We have a reason
to be ‘autonomous’, because it forms ‘an aspect of the good life.’13
Second, Raz is an ‘realist’ about reasons: that someone has a
reason to act is a ‘fact’, and it may hold true independent of their
belief as to whether they have a reason to so act.14 Beliefs may
sometimes be reasons, but in general reasons do not require belief. It
is, therefore, (in general) going to be a fact whether or not the
normal justification and independence conditions are satisfied
regardless of the beliefs of both the authority-agent and the subject.
Finally, whilst the Service Conception is the ‘main argument’ for
the justification of authority, Raz also details three ‘subsidiary
arguments’ that can be used to ‘extend’ it.15
The purpose of these three arguments is to recognise the very
limited role that consent to and respect for an authority can play as
reasons for justifying that authority. In short, in general neither
consent nor respect can justify authority that is not otherwise already
justified on the grounds of the Service Conception. They are limited
to merely an ‘expressive’ role. There are, however, very ‘marginal
cases’ where the value of the autonomy, loyalty, sense of identifi-
cation, and/or community achieved through such consent or respect
is sufficient to just ‘tip the balance’ of a regime that would others just
fall short of satisfying the Service Conception.16 In all these cases
though, the most important point stands: just as in the Service
Conception, authority is only legitimate where one best conforms to
reason by following the commands of the authority-agent.
II. THE QUESTION
The Service Conception, therefore, clearly consists in at least three
necessary conditions: the normal justification thesis, the indepen-
11 Raz (2010, p. 291).
12 Raz (2012, p. 14).
13 Raz (1986, p. 265).
14 It is a ‘fact’ in the ‘extended sense to designate that in virtue of which true of justified statements
are true or justified. By ‘‘fact’’ is meant simply that which can be designated by the use of the operator
‘‘the fact that…’’’: Raz (1999a, b, pp. 17–18).
15 Raz (1986, pp. 70, 80).
16 See, Raz (1986, pp. 84, 90, 93, 1995, p. 368). On why such consent can be constitutive of
autonomy: Raz (1989, p. 1183).
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dence condition and the dependence condition. Our question is
whether Raz presupposes a fourth necessary condition: that the
putative subject must believe that the putative authority-agent sat-
isfies the other three conditions.
Let us start with a prima facie interpretation, develop its compli-
cations, and then look to an alternative.
III. THE FIRST INTERPRETATION
If we turn to Raz’s most recent and supposedly authoritative expo-
sition of the Service Conception – ‘The Problem of Authority:
Revisiting the Service Conception’ (2006) – Raz appears to give an
explicitly affirmative answer to our question. In what he calls an
‘elaboration’ (or ‘refinement’) of the Service Conception he states:
The point of being under an authority is that it opens a way of improving one’s
conformity with reason. One achieves that by conforming to the authority’s
directives, and (special circumstances apart) one can reliably conform only if one
has reliable beliefs regarding who has legitimate authority, and what its directives
are. If one cannot have trustworthy beliefs that a certain body meets the condi-
tions for legitimacy, then one’s belief in its authority is haphazard, and cannot
(again special circumstances apart) be reliable. Therefore, to fulfil its function, the
legitimacy of an authority must be knowable to its subjects… [Otherwise] [t]here
is no authority over the matter, because to exist authorities must be knowable.17
This passage appears to state that not merely the subject’s belief but
‘reliable’ belief that the authority agent satisfies the Service
Conception’s ‘conditions of legitimacy’ is an additional – fourth –
necessary condition of the Service Conception. The idea of a ‘reliable
belief condition’ appears to involve two components: one actual and
the other hypothetical.18
The first, ‘actual’ component is that a subject must have an actual
‘belief’ that the authority satisfies the conditions of legitimacy. Pre-
sumably, this belief need not be particularly concrete. The subject
must simply agree, if asked, that the authority-agent satisfies the
17 Raz (2006, pp. 1025–1026).
18 Raz nevers explains the precise meaning of ‘special circumstances apart’. I shall assume, however,
that whatever its intended meaning, its covered in at least one of the interpretations I put forward.
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normal justification, independence and dependence conditions (and
presumably agree that this is sufficient to create a decisive reason for
her to act upon the direction of the authority).19
The second, ‘hypothetical’ component is that in order for such a belief
to be ‘reliable’ the subject must be able to undertake (but not necessarily
have actually undertaken) whatever level of ‘inquiry’ is reasonable to
establish the fact that such conditions of legitimacy are met:
In stating this argument I assumed that whenever one can form reliable beliefs that
the conditions for legitimacy are met, one can also have knowledge that they are
met. … [Something] is knowable if an inquiry of [a kind appropriate to the
matter’s importance] would yield that knowledge.20
I presume this means: (a) that the subject would have to conclude
their inquiry with, at least,21 the ‘justified belief’ that the authority is
legitimate; (b) that this belief would have to be sufficiently concrete
that they would agree, if asked, that the authority-agent satisfies each
of the three other necessary conditions for legitimacy, and (c) that
they would have appropriate forms of justification.22
According to Raz, the rationale for this reliable belief condition is
that it is necessary to ensure that authority always remains a way of
‘improving one’s conformity with reason.’ What precisely does this
mean?
In another work, Raz distinguishes between ‘conformity’ and
‘compliance’ with reason. The former occurs when one acts in a way
that is consistent with what one has reason to do. The latter occurs
not only when one acts in a way that is consistent with what one has
reason to do, but also does so because one understands and is
motivated by this reason.23
Given this definition, however, it is not straightforwardly clear
why having a reliable belief that an agent is a legitimate authority is
19 It seems to further a presumption that one must not merely believe that the authority-agent
satisfies the conditions, but also that they are sufficient to establish authority.
20 Raz (2006, p. 1025) [emphasis added].
21 Raz does not provide an exhaustive definition of ‘knowledge’ for the purposes of the knowability
condition. It shall serve my purposes to assume that, at minimum it entails justified belief. It may entail
more, but is superfluous to the requirements of my arguments.
22 This definition is not meant to be overly cognitive. On some issues, such as the authority agent’s
good faith, intuition may be perfectly, although defeasibly, acceptable. As Raz states in discussion of
defer to authority, it is sufficient that we acknowledge authority ‘from reflection on concrete events,
without being able to fully state all the features of the events which influenced us, nor all the ways they
affected us, nor the precise reasons why they led us to the conclusion we reached’ Raz (1998, p. 38).
23 Raz (1999a, b, pp. 178–179).
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necessary for conformity. For example, we may reliably conform to
reason through obeying an authority-agent’s command simply be-
cause we fear punishment by the authority-agent. In fact, we can be
manipulated in all sorts of ways. No belief that the authority-agent is
legitimate appears to be necessary.
Does this mean that Raz has, therefore, mistaken conformity for
compliance? Is the true legitimate aim of authority, ‘improving one’s
compliance with reason’?
No, this is not correct either. For an agent to comply with reason,
in Raz’s sense, they must understand and be motivated by the first
order reasons at stake. This, however, is clearly not necessary in the
case of authority. The entire point of ‘exclusionary reasons’ is to
exclude a subject being motivated by such first order reasons.
Instead, I suggest the following reading: the reliable belief con-
dition is necessary for ‘improving one’s conformity with reason’, if
we emphasise the implicit first person act. It is necessary if we are to
act with the intention of improving conformity with reason. This
appears to be the ultimate aim of the Service Conception and is
supported by an earlier passage:
In postulating that authorities are legitimate only if their directives enable their
subjects to better conform to reason, we see authority for what it is: not a denial of
people’s capacity for rational action, but simply one device, one method, through
the use of which people can achieve the goal (telos) of their capacity for rational
action, albeit not through its direct use. This way of understanding matters is
reinforced by the fact that in following authority, just as in following advice, or
being guided by any of the technical devices, one’s ultimate self-reliance is pre-
served, for it is one’s own judgment which directs one to recognize the authority
of another, just as it directs one to keep one’s promises, follow advice, use tech-
nical devices and the like.24
The (reliable) belief condition, therefore, appears to follow from
clarifying what Raz takes to be the purpose of authority under the
Service Conception. Authority is not justified because it is a device
that improves our conformity with reason, but rather because it is a
device that enables us to judge how to act in a manner that improves
our conformity with reason. We conform to first order reasons, by
complying with the second order reasons provided by authority.
24 Raz (2006, p. 1018). See also, Raz (1995, p. 360), on the anarchist’s mistake: ‘He further claims that
autonomy implies always deciding every issue for oneself on the merits of each case. This is an
unargued-for misconception. One way of wisely exercising one’s autonomy is to realize that in certain
matters one would do best to abide by the authority of another.’.
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This understanding of the Service Conception, drawn from parts
of Raz’s most recent work, also coheres with a claim made in one of
his earliest account. In his paper ‘Legitimate Authority’ (1979), Raz
states what he dubs the ‘the principle of autonomy’:
[R]eason never justifies abandoning one’s autonomy, that is, one’s right and duty
to act on one’s judgment of what ought to be done, all things considered.
And, in a footnote Raz continues: ‘it is clear that this principle of
autonomy is not really a moral principle but a principle of
rationality.’
With respect to this principle, Raz claims that, despite the con-
fusions of others, it does not entail the denial of authority. This is
because, correctly understood, authority only entails not acting upon
one’s judgment of what ought to be done, on the basis of ‘first order
reasons’ (that is, reasons not relating to reasons). However, this is
not the totality of possible reasons. There are ‘second order reasons’
such as exclusionary reasons that give us reasons not to act on
certain first order reasons. And, this is precisely what authority offers
(that is, exclusionary reasons supporting protected reasons).
Authority, therefore, can – and must – be consistent with the
principle of autonomy by reserving for the putative subject the right
and duty to act on their judgment of what ought to be done ‘all
things considered’ in the form of valid second order reasons as they
see them. Raz does not here expand upon the content of this
judgment, but we can now assume that it must, effectively, be the
reliable belief condition, that is, one must be satisfied that the
putative authority-agent satisfies the three other conditions of
legitimacy.25
IV. THE SECOND INTERPRETATION
Raz’s recent claim that authority must be knowable and his early
claim that authority must be consistent with principle of autonomy
25 Raz’s ‘principle of autonomy’ is curious. He never justifies it. Nor does he expand upon its
implications. Nor does he ever explicitly repeat it again in any further account of the Service Con-
ception as far as I can gather. Further, whilst he dubs it a principle of ‘autonomy’, he is clearly using the
word in a different sense to that he is usually associated with. Usually, as described above, for Raz
‘autonomy’ denotes a value, that is, the value of (part-) self-creation. It provides a first-order reason for
action. It also can be abandoned if outweighed by other reasons. This is precisely the point of the
‘independence condition’. The ‘autonomy’ to which the principle of autonomy refers, however, cannot
be abandoned. Further, it is not, strictly speaking, a moral value at all but instead a ‘principle of
rationality’.
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both appear to entail that he must assume a (reliable) belief condi-
tion as necessary for legitimate authority under the Service Con-
ception. However, other parts of Raz’s corpus could not indicate a
more different conclusion. I shall focus upon two in particular.
First, in his paper ‘Disagreement in Politics’, Raz asks what a
perfectionist government, established upon true beliefs about the
good (and thus reasons for action), owes to citizens who have false
beliefs about the good.
Raz accepts that, if the government justifies its authority on the
basis of its true beliefs, those citizens who have false beliefs may
never be able to accept the government’s authority as legitimate.
Presumably, this is the case even if they accept Raz’s Service Con-
ception as defining what would constitute legitimate authority. The
basic problem is that, given deep disagreement about the good, these
people cannot agree that the government does indeed ‘know best’
the reasons that can ground their decisive reasons for action; nor
perhaps, appreciate the proper importance of their autonomy. They
simply believe, even upon concerted reflection, that the government
has got those reasons wrong. Any governmental authority over
them, therefore, is inconsistent with such individuals fulfilling both
the actual and hypothetical components of the reliable belief con-
dition.
In this situation, in fact a situation Raz argues is inevitable in any
Western liberal democracy, he clearly upholds the government’s
authority. Of course, Raz acknowledges that such a government
must cohere with the independence condition and in many cir-
cumstances allow those with false beliefs to act upon them, for
example, in their daily lives:
But it is a far cry from letting people rely on their own views, to denying the
legitimacy of the constitution, even though it is based on sound principles, because
it is mistakenly disputed by some of its subjects.26
26 Raz (1998, p. 43). Immediately preceded by: ‘Remember that people have a duty to respect their
own rationality. That includes the duty not to take the fact that they hold a belief as a reason for
anything. There is no reason to think that others must take such beliefs as reasons out of respect for the
people who hold them. To be sure, respecting people’s rationality is inconsistent with systematically
preventing them from relying on their own beliefs.’ Footnotes omitted. Elsewhere Raz discusses
whether a valid (but not sound) argument that moves from a subject’s false beliefs to them concluding
that an authority is justified, yields justification: ‘But does [this] route yield a justification at all? It relies
on the fact that it is possible to derive true conclusions (the principles of legitimate constitution) from
false principles. But no such derivation can count as a justification of anything since it relies on
falsehood.’ 41.
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In fact, far from those with false beliefs negating the authority of
those running the state:
People with principled objection to the government of the day, or some of them,
such as Nazis and religious extremists, are an important part of the reason why the
rest of us think that governments have authority. They are the people we need a
government to control.27
It follows that, seemingly, that the belief condition must be explicitly
rejected:
What is normally claimed to be required is that the justification [of the consti-
tution from which a government bases its authority] follows from, or is at least
consistent with, views that people already have. If this means that people must be
capable of seeing the cogency of the justification without abandoning any of their
current views, then this is still too strong and will most likely lead to the con-
clusion that no Western government is legitimate.28
This position, seemingly the polar opposite to what we have
discussed above, also coheres with that put forward in another pa-
per, ‘Government by Consent’. In this paper, Raz reaffirms that,
putting aside the subsidiary arguments mentioned above,29 any
legitimate perfectionist government authority must satisfy the three
conditions of the Service Conception detailed above.30 He then asks,
what could consent to authority possibly add if these conditions are
fulfilled (apart from playing a minor role in the subsidiary arguments
for authority)? The answer is ‘none’:
Is not the fact that an authority meets the conditions … sufficient to establish its
legitimacy. If so, what room is there for consent? It appears that one can validly
consent only to an authority that is legitimate anyway, on independent grounds.
… There seems to be nothing that consenting to be governed can do. It imposes
no duty and confers no right except those that exist independently anyway.31
27 Raz (1998, p. 40).
28 Raz (1998, p. 39).
29 The only exception that Raz allows to this position is that consent may play a ‘modest role’ where
it acts an expression of trust in government: such an expression being, in and of itself, valuable.
However, trust is merely ‘owed to a just and humane government that has legitimate authority in
virtue of the conditions of authority in any case.’ Only in marginal cases where a government ‘nearly’
meets these conditions anyway, can it act substantively to ‘tip the balance.’ Raz (1995, p. 368).
30 The normal justification thesis, Raz (1995, p. 358); the independence condition, Raz (1995, pp.
366–367); and the dependence condition, putting aside deviant cases: Raz (1995, pp. 358, 359). In this
paper, Raz refers to these conditions as the ‘conditions of legitimacy’.
31 Raz (1995, 366) [Emphasis added].
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Requiring actual consent as a necessary condition for authority
would not be the same thing as requiring the fulfilment of the
reliable belief condition. The former involves the exercise of a
‘normative power over oneself’, that is a power to change one’s
protected reasons. The latter involves merely belief about the
whether following another would lead to best conformity with
reason.
However, if the latter is taken to be a necessary condition for
authority, the conceptual gap virtually disappears. This is because the
fulfilment of the reliable belief condition entails that the subject must
believe that she has best reason to submit to the putative authority-
agent. Thus her only rational action, on her own terms, is to decide to
obey the putative authority-agent. It may be objected, however, that
this still does not constitute consent (or more accurately some form of
‘rational consent’) because deciding to obey someone – or realising
that one should do so – does not necessarily create a duty to do so.
This may be true. However, this cannot be Raz’s own response, since
with the fulfilment of the reliable belief condition, authority exists and
thus a duty to obey the authority-agent.
Regardless, even if we can retain some principled conceptual gap
between rational consent and the reliable belief condition, there is
still obvious ‘room’ for consent in establishing the legitimacy of a
government if the Service Conception includes the reliable belief
condition. This obvious role is as evidence that the latter is fulfilled.
Consent, assuming it is rational, would be good evidence that the
subject actually believes that the normal justification, independence
and dependence conditions are fulfilled. However, according to Raz
in this discussion, it does not matter what the subject thinks. In fact,
‘it is part of the notion of government’ that:
Governments decide what is best for their subjects and present them with the
results as binding conclusions that they are bound to follow. A government …
says: ‘‘We are better able to decide how you should act. Our decision is in these
laws. You are bound by them and should follow them whether or not you agree
with them.’’32
No matter the precise relationship between consent and the reliable
belief condition, Raz’s argument that there is no room for the former
appears to exclude any room for the latter too.
32 Raz (1995, p. 359).
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V. RECONCILIATION?
It is hard to reconcile Raz’s remarks within ‘Disagreement in Politics’
and ‘Government by Consent’, with his remarks about the need for
reliable belief and the paramountcy of the principle of autonomy. At
various points, however, he does offer clues as to how this might be
achieved. I shall run through various alternatives only to dismiss
them and reinforce Raz’s choice: the reliable belief condition or
perfectionist government, he cannot have both.
A. Dispensing with the ‘Actual Belief’ Component
At first blush, we might turn to some remarks in ‘Disagreement in
Politics’ that suggests Raz drops the ‘actual belief’ component of the
reliable belief condition, as interpreted above. It is not a necessary
condition of authority that a subject actually has a belief that an
authority is legitimate. The ‘hypothetical’ component is, actually, the
only relevant condition:
Justifications [of the legitimacy of an exercise of authority] are in principle publicly
available. There can be contingent reasons why this person or that will find it very
difficult to come to realize that the principles are justified. But there is nothing
inherently private about justification. Some people are not in a position fully to
understand some justification or another, their senses may be impaired, or their
powers of understanding limited. For the most part, even they are capable,
however, of realizing that the principles or beliefs in question are justified. They
would be relying in part on testimony, as we all do in justifying most of our beliefs
for which we have any justification.33
The thought appears to be here, that, although at particular times
subjects may not have a belief as to the legitimacy of authority, they
could through inquiry (including by using the testimony of others)
come to have such a belief, and it would be justified.
The problem with this position is this. The entire force of Raz’s
comments with respect to politics and disagreement is intended to
explain why a true perfectionist government should be able to
exercise legitimate authority in the face of deep disagreement, where
an political liberal government could not. This is because the Service
33 Raz (1998, pp. 37–38); followed by ‘Some people would say that adding ‘being capable of being
justified to its subjects’ to ‘being justified’ makes a difference, namely, it states that only a justification
which can be publicly and comprehensively and explicitly articulated and communicated can lend
legitimacy to a regime. But this is a mistake.’
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Conception is meant to explain why the former government can act
upon on the basis of perfectionist reasons in the face of deep disagree-
ment about those reasons.
However, if the Service Conception only applies if the reliable
belief condition is satisfied, and the reliable belief condition is only
satisfied if, after inquiry, all deep disagreement would disappear, then
Raz’s entire argument rests on the empirical claim that all deep
disagreements are just not that deep after all. However, if this
empirical claim were true, then it would just as well provide political
liberal governments with the same ability to exercise legitimate
authority in the same situations, in the same way, but on the
alterative basis that everyone would simply agree, upon inquiry, to
the reasons justifying the command. If the empirical claim is true,
Raz’s theory is redundant. However, if it is false, Raz’s theory offers
no account of legitimate authority where it is most required.
And the fact of the matter is, clearly, that the empirical claim is
false. Indeed, on many issues, such as abortion, or the nature of
personal responsibility, or animal rights, or the value of certain
cultural traditions, not to speak of the profound general religious and
philosophical disagreements, actual, sustained, inquiry on all sides
has only entrenched disagreement. This means that any command
issued by a perfectionist government, based upon the reasons that it
takes to be true, even if they are true, could not possibly satisfy even
the amended reliable belief condition suggested.34
In other words, on the very issues that Raz aims to uniquely
empower perfectionist governments with legitimate authority, he
fails. We must, therefore, look to a further interpretation of the
reliable belief condition to try, once again, to bring some form of
internal coherence to Raz’s theory.
B. Amending the ‘Hypothetical Inquiry’ component
A different interpretation of the reliable belief condition is that we
not merely abandon the first, ‘actual belief’ component, but also
34 Sometimes Raz seeks to claim that the extent of actual deep disagreement is much smaller than
often claimed. This may be true. However, it is implausible to think that many and very important
disagreements shall not remain. One only needs think of those people who think all reasons for action
come from the God’s command (of whom there are many) and anyone who is an atheist. In this case,
they may agree on the rulings that a government may make, but not agree on the reasons for it, even
upon extensive inquiry.
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amend the second ‘hypothetical’ inquiry component. Under this
interpretation, the relevant hypothetical inquiry would not be that
which the actual putative subject would undertake if given the chance;
but rather that which some form of hypothetical putative subject would
undertake.
There is some possible textual support for this interpretation. Raz
states:
Regarding any justified principle, people of normal capacities are in principle able
to understand that it is justified.35
The claim, here, appears to be, that if people of normal capacities are
capable of forming the requisite justified belief after inquiry that an
authority is legitimate, then the reliable belief condition is satisfied. It
is not necessary, therefore, that people with ‘sub-normal’ capacities
be so capable in order to qualify as subjects. This seems to be
supported by this passage:
Some people’s mental capacities are so limited that it is in principle impossible for
them to comprehend the (correct) justification of the principles in question. If that
is a problem for the legitimacy of government, it is not solved by taking account of
any mistaken ideologies they have, or of their misguided religious beliefs: If their
mental capacities are too limited to understand correct justifications, then they are
also too limited to understand any plausible incorrect one. The problem they raise,
if any, is not one of accommodating disagreement over principles.36
So, what does Raz mean by ‘normal capacities’? Raz appears to
equivocate between two very different meanings.
Sometimes, ‘normal capacities’ appears to track whatever are the
capacities of the average person. It is hard to define, precisely what
the ‘average’ person’s capacities are, with respect to moral issues.
However, loosely we might presume it would correlate with being a
member of the majority opinion on the majority of moral issues.
Other times, however, ‘normal capacities’ appears to track
whatever are the capacities of those people who would actually
come to realise the true legitimacy of any authority after inquiry.
There is no necessary requirement, therefore, that any set of actual
subjects would need to actually have such ‘normal capacities’.
35 Raz (1998, p. 38).
36 Raz (1998, p. 38).
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This equivocation gives the appearance of plausibility to this
interpretation of the reliable belief condition, but once drawn apart
the plausibility disappears.
First, if we take the first possible meaning, then it is not clear why
it should be a part of the test for legitimate authority, unless it is
driven by an attempt to respect actual, even if unreliable, belief as far
as is possible. A majority of people may well be wrong about a moral
issue.37 Why else then should a true perfectionist government, nec-
essarily as a matter of principle, be held hostage to the mistaken view
of such a majority, any more than it should be held hostage by the
mistaken view of a minority?38 Such a government may require
majority support for instrumental reasons of stability and de facto
authority, but that they are merely contingent reasons that speak to
whether the normal justification condition holds.
However, if we now turn to the alternative meaning, then the
amended reliable belief condition is rendered entirely redundant. As
long as the other three necessary conditions of the Service Con-
ception are satisfied, it is hard to see how the reliable belief condi-
tion, at least with respect to the authority’s moral capacities, would
not be trivially fulfilled.39 No subject need actually be able to satisfy
it because, perhaps, they all have sub-normal capacities.40
What, then, is the point of this amended reliable belief condition?
If it does not demand that all subjects, themselves, could know that
an authority-agent is legitimate, then what does it add to assure
those subjects that at least those who could know the truth, (if they
exist) could know? Why not just admit that it is the objective moral
fact that the authority-agent satisfies the three other necessary con-
ditions of the Service Conception that actually counts, and stop
attempting to insert an additional thinly veiled, trivial ‘objective-
subjective’ condition?
37 Note, it is irrelevant that, under the right conditions, a majority may get things right, a majority of
the time as, for example, argued by Estlund (2008). The reliable belief condition is not there to ensure
that the relevant authority actually, in truth, satisfied the other conditions for legitimacy. That is already
assumed. Rather, the reliable belief condition is there to ensure that subjects can recognize this fact.
38 Putting aside the contingent factors relating to de facto authority.
39 It may still be the case that no one could possibly understand the truth of some authority agent’s
legitimacy if, for example, there were certain physical barriers to knowledge.
40 If we think at least some need to have normal capacities so defined, why? Why is the truth itself
not enough?
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C. A Mysterious Middle Ground
Finally, one may think that Raz is actually seeking to establish some
form of middle ground. On this middle ground, all (or virtually all)
people are thought to have ‘normal’ capacities. However, it is also
accepted that some of them, if not many of these people with normal
capacities, may sometimes be actually incapable of having a justified
belief in the true legitimacy of authority-agents. This is because they
simply have a mistaken conception of the good. However, we can,
so the claim goes, in some sense still attribute such a capability to
those mistaken individuals ‘in principle’. We might read the following
passage as an attempt to do this:
Regarding any justified principle, people of normal capacities are in principle able
to understand that it is justified. The requirement that the principles on which the
constitution is based be justified already includes the requirement that every
potential subject of the constitution be in principle capable of understanding that
they are justified.41
The problem is that Raz never makes good on the morally relevant
sense in which we can attribute a capability to have a justified belief
to someone ‘in principle’, if they are ‘in fact’ incapable of so believing
after inquiry.
To see the prima facie puzzlement let us take an example. Let us
assume that Robert Nozick’s political theory was true. Let us also
assume, that John Rawls, undertook a significant inquiry, with his
own actual beliefs in hand, and that inquiry failed to yield a justified
belief that Nozick was right. I would say that Rawls, therefore, was
simply incapable of so believing – ‘in principle’ and ‘in fact’.
Now we could say that if Rawls had different beliefs when
undertaking such an inquiry, then he may have been capable of the
relevant justified belief. But that does not seem to me to entail that,
although Rawls could not ‘in fact’ acquire justified belief, he could ‘in
principle’. Instead, it seems to simply rely upon the morally irrele-
vant tautology that if Rawls were not Rawls, but someone else, then
he might have been able to justifiably believe Nozick. This tautology
is morally irrelevant because I could play this trick with any being. If
my dog were not a dog, but a libertarian philosopher, then he might
41 Raz (1998, p. 38).
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be able to justifiably believe Nozick, too. Does my dog, thereby,
satisfy the reliable belief condition?
One might reply that Rawls unlike the dog has some ‘unrealised
capacity’ to know (for example, because he is human). But at this
point I just no longer have a grip on the morally relevant sense of
‘capacity’. I do not understand what it is for me to have a capacity in
principle, purely because a lot of beings like me in other ways have
that capacity in fact. Perhaps, that lack of capacity is precisely what
makes the moral difference between us?
This may all inevitably lead us into the depths of metaphysics of
personal identity and radical capacities. Yet, regardless, for instant
moral purposes, what is ultimately important is the morally relevant
distinction that Raz is seeking to track with the difference between
‘in principle capable’ and ‘not in principle capable.’ At this stage, it
certainly cannot be Raz’s aim to track what a subject would willingly
comply with, and that which they would not. Rawls, for example,
would not willingly comply with Nozick’s theory.
Perhaps one might initially posit that Raz is implicitly aiming to
track our (as opposed to the dog’s) ‘rational capacity’ in some sense.
Rawls has a rational capacity; a rational capacity is the capacity to
follow true reasons for action; therefore, even if Rawls’ capacity has
here malfunctioned, it could ‘in principle’ have functioned well.
However, this just replaces one mysterious sense of ‘capacity’ with
another. And that sense can only have plausibility because it plays
upon another equivocation: between the capacity that all beings,
human or animal, have to conform to reason (including by mere
manipulation, such as with threats of punishment); and, the capacity
that Rawls, by presumption, and other human beings, do not have to
comply with reason, that is, to not merely do what reason requires
but do so upon because one recognizes its truth.42
I can only presume that Raz is implicitly aiming to track respon-
sibility in some sense. That is, ceteris paribus we can be held
responsible for obeying or not obeying a command that we are
42 Alternatively, one might argue that Raz is seeking to track Reason, that is, that is our ‘general
capacity reflectively to recognize and respond to reasons’ Raz (2011, p. 86). This capacity may mal-
function, for example, when we fail to justifiably believe in the legitimate authority of true perfectionist
government. However, in having a capacity to malfunction, the inference is that we have the capacity
‘in principle’ to function properly. But this just, once again, plays upon a mysterious sense ‘capacity’ in
which only some people are actually capable, after inquiry of ‘not malfunctioning’, yet all are capable ‘in
principle’ of not malfunctioning.
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capable of justifiably believing as legitimate ‘in principle’, but not
that which we are ‘not in principle’ capable of so believing.
This may be true. However, here presented, the metaphysical tail
is wagging the dog. If this is the case, we are actually waiting upon a
theory of responsibility to clarify Raz’s theory of authority, rather
than the other way around. We are waiting for a theory of
responsibility to clarify, by stipulation, what Raz means by ‘the
capacity to justifiably believe in principle.’ Perhaps, in this case, Raz
should replace the ‘reliable belief condition’ with a more transpar-
ently named ‘responsibility condition’, especially since actual reliable
belief would have to be ultimately irrelevant to it?
I shall only state at this point, however, that given the prima facie
difficulties of attributing responsibility to any agent (dog, human, or
famous political philosopher) for something that they are in fact
incapable of doing, the onus of proof is well and truly placed upon
Raz.
VI. A THIRD INTERPRETATION
Given the inconsistency between our first two interpretations of
Raz’s position, he appears to be faced with a choice: either the
Service Conception includes the reliable belief condition, which
ensures respect for the principle of autonomy and excludes the
justification of the legitimacy of perfectionist government; or the
Service Conception excludes the reliable belief condition, which al-
lows for the justification of the legitimacy of perfectionist govern-
ment but excludes respect for the principle of autonomy.
There is one further interpretation of Raz’s work that would
allow him to consistently advocate the legitimacy of perfectionist
government, but restricts its authority only to those citizens that
fulfil the reliable belief condition. Under this interpretation Raz’s
theory of ‘legitimate government’ actually incorporates two different
theories of legitimacy.
The first theory is a theory of legitimate authority along the lines
described in our first interpretation and which presupposes basic
equality as equal fundamental authority. In other words, the gov-
ernment can have no authority over any individuals who do not
reliably believe that it satisfies the normal justification, independence
and dependence conditions.
THE SERVICE CONCEPTION
The second theory is a theory of legitimate coercion that com-
plements the first. This theory justifies coercion, where necessary,
with respect to those individuals who are subject to the govern-
ment’s authority in accordance with the first theory. However, it
also justifies coercion, where necessary, with respect to those indi-
viduals who are not so subject to the government’s authority. Most
importantly, it justifies coercion against those who do not accept the
government’s authority because they do not believe that it satisfies
the normal justification, dependence and/or independence condi-
tions (although it in fact does).
This interpretation of Raz’s position finds support in one passage
in particular.43 Here Raz says:
It is important to remember that a government’s power [qua right to legitimately
coerce] can and normally does quite properly extend to people who do not accept
its authority. They are subject to its power partly because those who accept its
authority are willing to obey its instructions, even when they affect people who do
not accept its authority.
The passage appears to be arguing that the government’s right to
legitimately coerce extends both over those it has authority over,
and those it cannot possibly have authority over because they do not
accept its authority. By implication, accepting the authority of a
government over oneself is a necessary condition of its having such
authority over oneself. This is reinforced by the way Raz then
divides the ways a government ‘controls and influences people’ into
three rough but seemingly exhaustive categories. First, some people
accept its authority and obey its instructions. Second, the government
manipulates the environment in which all its people (those who
accept its authority and those who do not) live by constructing
roads, digging canals, etc. ‘without attempting thereby to exercise
authority over them.’ And, finally:
[A] government controls people by providing remedies for breaches of laws and
for the violation of people’s rights. People who are not subject to the authority of
the law may then obey the rules for prudential reasons, or because even though
they have no duty to obey, disobedience will do more harm than good.
So this last category of people appears to be those who cannot be in the
first category because they are people that the government does not
authority over because they do not accept its authority. However, so the
43 Raz (1986, pp. 102–104).
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argument goes, the government can have ‘power’ over them, both to
manipulate and coerce, when it satisfies the other three conditions for
authority. The fact that ‘such action transcends its authority casts no
doubt on its justifiability’, because in all such matters the government is
in ‘a position comparable to that of every private individual’ who can
also manipulate and coerce other to obey their moral duties.
It is difficult to find much textual support for this interpretation
beyond this passage. However, it does have the advantage of explaining
how Raz can sustain the reliable belief as a necessary condition of
authority (coming very close to the political liberal position with respect
to government authority) but still advocate the legitimate right of
controversial perfectionist government to rule (contrary to the political
liberal position with respect to coercive government power).
However, the downside of this interpretation is that Raz must abandon
an intuitive relationship between the right of governments to coerce its
citizens, and its claim to authority. This intuitive relationship is that the
government’s right to coerce its citizens primarily exists to back and
support its authority. For example, and most obviously, within the
criminal system the state punishes citizens precisely because they have to
conform to its authoritative directives. It is the criminal’s breaking of the
law, not their failure to conform to first order reasons independent of the
law, that justifies coercion. Now if the third interpretation is correct, then
the only citizens to whom this applies will be the procedurally irrational,
that is, those who believe that the state is a genuine authority and has
given them a decisive reason to not do X, but they do it anyway. Those
who reject the authority of the government, by contrast, can act contrary
to a law in a procedurally rational way, but cannot be punished for
breaking it. The law could never bind them in the first place because they
do not fulfil the reliable belief condition. They may be coerced – managed,
contained, manipulated and controlled – but not punished. So if a criminal
does not have a reliable belief that a law is a law, she cannot break it!
VII. CONCLUSION
The problem I have in mind is the problem of the possible justification of sub-
jecting one’s will to that of another, and of the normative standing of demands to
do so. The account of authority that I offered, many years ago, under the title of
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the service conception of authority, addressed this issue, and assumed that all
other problems regarding authority are subsumed under it.—Joseph Raz, ‘The
Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception’44
The problem that Joseph Raz began investigating in his first work on
authority in 1979 was about the rationality of subjecting one’s will to
another. He was asking what type of normative phenomenon
legitimate authority had to be, such that one could recognise
someone as an authority, and rationally comply with her directives.
Framing the ‘problem of authority’ from this point of view – the
point of view of the subject – it is natural that as a necessary
condition of it being so rational is that one have a reliable belief that
the authority-agent is an authority.
However, whilst Raz began his work by trying to answer this
question, he ultimately sought to deliver an answer that was inde-
pendent of the subject’s point of view. He sought to lay out the
necessary and sufficient conditions for when X has authority over Y
simpliciter. In doing so, in his most definitive texts, he has expressly
incorporated the reliable belief condition that was intuitively nec-
essary to answer the original question, into this general theory of
authority. Furthermore, when seeking to articulate the most basic
rationale of the theory, he has relied upon the condition. To para-
phrase the passage cited above,45 the Service Conception is intended
to reveal authority for ‘what it is’, not a denial of one’s rational
capacity, but another tool to realise it. And, ‘this way of under-
standing matters’ is reinforced by the fact that, with the reliable
belief condition, ‘one’s ultimate self-reliance is preserved, for it is
one’s own judgment which directs one to recognize the authority of
another.’
As I have argued, if Raz ultimately wants to maintain this posi-
tion, then he must give up all pretence to being true defender of
perfectionist authority. Depending upon his accompanying theory of
legitimate coercion, he will have more in common with political
liberals, than the likes of perfectionists such as Hurka, Wall and
Enoch.46 The authority of government will be restricted by the be-
liefs (false or otherwise) of its citizens, and thus also disagreement
between them.
44 Raz (2006, p. 1003).
45 See above, Section III.
46 Enoch (2015), Hurka (1993) and Wall (1998).
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Alternatively, Raz could drop the reliable belief condition. In
doing so, the Service Conception would clearly support the exten-
sion of a perfectionist government’s authority over both those sub-
jects who accept this fact, and those who do not. Further, it could
coherently punish both sets of subjects for failing to comply with its
authority. In another part of ‘The Problem of Authority’, Raz reaf-
firms that the telos of our rational capacity is to conform to reason.
But he goes on to point out that we value that capacity primarily, for
the end it is meant to achieve, rather than the exercise of the capacity
itself:
We value the ability to exercise one’s judgment and to rely on it in action, but it is
a capacity we value because of its purpose, which is, by its very nature, to secure
conformity with reason. The point is perfectly general. The value of many of our
capacities should not be reduced to the value of their use. But, even where their
value also reflects the value of the freedom to use our capacities or not, it depends
on the value of their successful use.47
It would be consistent with this view, that insofar as an authority
offers an individual a way to achieve the ultimate purpose of her
rational capacity, that is, conformity with reason, then the existence
of such authority should not be undermined by the fact that this
capacity has misfired in failing to recognize such authority.
Following the direction of the authority remains the best way to
conform with reason, whether she recognizes it or not. Perhaps, in
this way, there lies a principled retreat for Raz to drop the reliable
belief condition.
However, it is worth reflecting upon Raz’s clear discomfort in
ever boldly coming out and holding this position. This is because it is
a position that implies that authority can be (perhaps often will be)
inconsistent with subjects acting on their own judgement. Raz’s old
‘principle of autonomy’ will have to be abandoned. Instead, subjects
will be managed, manipulated, coerced and/or controlled. And this
will not necessarily be a small group of the ‘irrational’, but include
anyone disagrees with the putatively true conception of the good
upon which the perfectionist government might be based. This may
not be a new complaint against perfectionism, but it is one that Raz
would need to finally come out and own up to.
47 Raz (2006, p. 1017), footnote omitted.
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